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Abstract—In some fields of industrial automation, such as
nuclear power plant (NPP) industry in Finland, thorough verifica-
tion of systems and demonstration of their safety are mandatory.
Model checking is one of the techniques to achieve a high level
of reliability. The goal of this paper is practical: we explore
which type of model checking – either explicit-state or symbolic –
is more suitable to verify instrumentation and control (I&C)
applications, represented as function block networks. Unlike
previous studies, in addition to the common open-loop approach,
which views the controller model alone, we consider closed-loop
verification, where the plant is also modeled. In addition, we
present a procedure to translate block networks to the language
of the SPIN explicit-state model checker.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of formal verification methods, and in particular of
model checking [1], is especially justifiable in safety-critical
domains like the nuclear industry [2]–[5]. This is due to both
the need to avoid accidents, but also the practical need to
demonstrate to regulators that the systems are sufficiently safe.
Model checking is a formal verification approach which an-
alyzes the state space of the system under verification. In open-
loop model checking, only the controller’s model is analyzed,
whereas in closed-loop model checking [6] the model of the
controlled plant is also taken into account. Modeling feedback
from the controller’s environment usually reduces the state
space of the model [7]. On the other hand, from the safety
point of view, limiting behavior of the model by introducing
the plant causes concern. Still, if closing the loop means
that we can analyze applications that would otherwise be too
complex, the approach would be very useful to supplement
the more common open-loop assessment. Another practical
advantage of closed-loop models is filtering out unrealistic
feedback from the environment. Analysts would therefore
avoid spending excess time on interpreting counterexamples
dealing with irrelevant, even physically impossible scenarios.
Previously [8], [9], we verified nuclear I&C applications
represented as block diagrams using a framework based on
symbolic verifier NuSMV [10]. Usually, this verifier per-
formed quite fast in the open-loop case, but not in the
closed-loop case: while performing verification with explicit-
state plant models generated automatically using the approach
from [9], we noticed that such models significantly increase
time required for model checking, which may be caused by
their complexity. These results comply with the ones presented
in [11]. Moreover, within a reasonable time limit, NuSMV was
unable to process some models even in the open-loop scenario.
To mitigate the aforementioned problems, this paper ex-
plores the case of model checking block networks using the
explicit-state model checker SPIN [12]. According to previous
studies [13], [14], while suffering from the so-called state
space explosion problem [15], SPIN scales better to harder ver-
ification problems than symbolic model checkers. Our primary
interest is its application in closed-loop verification, whose
application in the nuclear I&C domain we are exploring. In
particular, the approach [9] generates plant models with small
state spaces, which must reduce verification time compared
to the open-loop case if an explicit-state model checker is
used. Thus, we expect SPIN to handle larger plant models
in realistic time, allowing us to consider more detailed (and
hence potentially more reliable) plant models.
The key contribution of this paper is the comparison of
explicit-state and symbolic model checking on the problem of
verifying an I&C block network. The comparison is performed
in both open-loop and closed-loop cases. In addition to per-
forming the comparison, the paper proposes a procedure to
translate block networks to the language of the SPIN verifier
so that they could be processed efficiently.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, necessary
details concerning model checking are provided. In Section III,
the way how we model I&C applications is described. Sec-
tion IV compares the results of using SPIN and NuSMV
on our model checking problem. In Section V, our study is
compared with prior research. Section VI concludes the paper
and outlines future work.
II. MODEL CHECKING
Model checking [1] is a formal verification technique which
checks certain properties about the formal model of the consid-
ered system by performing exhaustive state space analysis. In
the industrial context, model checking is used to ensure PLC
program correctness [16], [17]. The use of model checking
in safety assessment of nuclear I&C systems is considered
in [2]–[5], [18].
A. Temporal logics
Properties to be checked are formulated in formal languages
such as linear temporal logic (LTL) [19], computation tree
logic (CTL) [20], and property specification language (PSL).
In this paper, we will consider only LTL specifications. In LTL,
in addition to Boolean statements about the state of the system
(e.g. certain variables have certain values), the user is allowed
to use temporal operators. These operators allow writing
properties checking the validity of system behaviors, which are
represented as infinite sequences of states. A temporal formula
is satisfied for the formal model if and only if it is satisfied
for each behavior specified by the model.
The most commonly used temporal operators are G, F, X
and U. Assume that f and g are temporal formulas. Temporal
formula G f means that f is satisfied globally along the
behavior of the system. Then, F f states that f is satisfied at
least once along the behavior, X f means that it is satisfied in
the next state of the behavior, and f U g requires g to become
true eventually, and f to be true until this moment.
B. Explicit-state model checking and SPIN
Explicit-state model checking is based on explicit state space
analysis: that is, each processed reachable state of the system
is represented in memory explicitly. The drawback of explicit-
state model checking is state space explosion [15]: time and
memory required to verify the system grows linearly with the
number of its possible states. In turn, the number of possible
states can be exponential of the number of bits used to store
a single state of the system.
SPIN [12] is an explicit-state model checker which sup-
ports LTL. The textual language employed by SPIN is called
Promela. In Promela, the user can build a formal model as
a number of processes, which can execute asynchronously
or adhering to explicitly defined means of synchronization.
Processes execute statement by statement, and statement ex-
ecutions can interleave between processes unless a group of
statements is declared as atomic. Furthermore, the keyword
d_step merges multiple deterministic statements in a way
that their intermediate states are not stored in memory, which
makes model processing faster. Below, we provide an example
of Promela process type which is responsible for introducing
a unit delay: the output is defined by the value of the
variable last, which stores the input value from the previous
execution of the process.
bool INPUT, OUTPUT, last = 0;





C. Symbolic model checking and NuSMV
Symbolic model checking [21] was introduced as a means of
mitigating the state space explosion problem. In it, state sub-
sets are encoded implicitly as Boolean formulas represented
by binary decision diagrams (BDDs). The reason why the state
space explosion problem is mitigated is, according to [15], that
“in many practical situations space requirements for Boolean
functions are exponentially smaller than for explicit represen-
tation.” The key Boolean relations used in symbolic model
checking are the ones representing the initial state (init) and
possible state transitions (trans) of the system. Unfortunately,
BDD processing is done using heuristics, and thus symbolic
model checking may still represent a computational challenge
for sufficiently complex systems.
NuSMV is a symbolic verifier capable of working with
modular systems. It supports LTL, CTL and PSL. LTL
and PSL can be checked not only using BDDs, but also
with bounded model checking (BMC) [22]. Unlike SPIN,
all NuSMV modules execute synchronously (although asyn-
chrony can be modeled by forcing some modules to keep
their states unchanged). NuSMV modules are formed not
of sequential code, but of the declarations of init and trans
relations. Below, a NuSMV module representing the unit delay
is given as an example. Notice that the transition relation is
specified implicitly by assigning the next value of the variable









D. Open-loop and closed-loop model checking
When industrial controllers are verified, this can be done in
either open loop or closed loop. Open-loop model checking
considers the model of the controller alone: its inputs are
allowed to take any possible values (within certain ranges or
value sets). In contrast, in the closed-loop case [6], the model
of the controller is connected with the model of the plant in
a feedback loop. This allows modeling the controller in the
environment where it is supposed to operate in production. The
presence of the plant model also allows verifying properties
that involve plant variables unobservable by the controller. For
properties which do not involve such variables, model check-
ing outcomes may be different in open-loop and closed-loop
cases, since in the first case plant behaviors are unrestricted.
A comparison of both the techniques is done in [11], and
one of the conclusions of [11] states that these techniques are
complementary. However, in [11] closed-loop model checking
is slower than open-loop one. Two reasons, both of which are
related to the use of symbolic verification and NuSMV, may
explain such a result. First, the state of a closed-loop model
is composed not only of the controller state but also of the
plant state. This means a larger number of Boolean variables in
BDDs, which, all else being equal, increases the computational
complexity of working with them. Second, the length of the
model’s textual description is larger when the plant model is
considered, which makes NuSMV process larger BDDs.
E. Model checking of nuclear I&C applications
In the Finnish nuclear industry, model checking has been
used for nearly a decade to evaluate the design of I&C
application software. Tens of issues have been identified,
leading to design changes in safety classified systems [4]. A
systematic methodology for modeling function block based
nuclear automation systems has been proposed in [3]. In
practice, model checking has been utilized in the Finnish
nuclear industry by the regulator (STUK) for evaluating the
I&C design of the Olkiluoto 3 power plant under construction,
by the utility Fortum in the I&C renewal project of the Loviisa
plants, and by the utility Fennovoima for evaluating the
functional I&C architecture of another new-build (Hanhikivi 1)
being planned [4].
A key challenge in model checking is to avoid the state
space explosion phenomenon, which is a particularly serious
problem in software verification [1], [15]. For I&C application
software, several factors increase the state space:
1) processing of large amounts of analogue (numerical)
data;
2) the use of memory and delay components to deal with
timing and sequencing [5];
3) feedback loops.
While nuclear I&C functionality – especially in safety
classified systems – should be kept simple, the need for fault
tolerance means that for each process variable, there may be up
to four redundant sets of measurements. The different, physi-
cally isolated “channels” of the systems exchange information
and perform voting over control actions. Signal validity is used
to exclude “bad” data from voting, if measurements fail or
communication is lost [18].
The complexity of typical nuclear safety I&C functions is
usually not an issue for model checkers like NuSMV. Excep-
tions include applications that process and store numerical data
to memory by including complex control logic and/or feedback
loops. Even for strictly binary logic, the sheer number of
redundant inputs can lead to prohibitively long analysis times.
III. FORMAL MODELING OF I&C APPLICATIONS
To model I&C applications formally in discrete-state model
checkers such as NuSMV and SPIN, they need to be repre-
sented as finite-state models. We achieve such a representation
by first modeling basic blocks manually in NuSMV and
Promela, and then drawing a block network in the software
tool called MODCHK [8], [18], developed by VTT. Previously,
this tool has been successfully applied by VTT in several
customer projects related to Finnish nuclear I&C industry.
MODCHK diagrams can be further converted to NuSMV and
then translated into Promela. All the mentioned procedures
will be described in more detail further in this section.
A. Basic blocks
A Mealy finite-state machine is a tuple (S, s0, I, O, δ, λ).
Here, S in a finite set of states and s0 ∈ S is the initial
state. Then, I is a set of inputs, each of which has a finite
set of possible values (e.g. Booleans or integers). The set
of all input values combinations will be referred to as v(I).
Similarly, O is a set of outputs, and v(O) is the set of output
value combinations. Finally, δ : S × v(I)→ S is a transition
function and λ : S × v(I)→ v(O) is an output function.
A basic block type is an arbitrary Mealy finite-state machine.
As an example of a basic block type, consider the block type
which calculates the conjunction of three Boolean arguments.
In this case, S = {s0}, that is, there is only one state. Then,
I is the set formed of three Boolean inputs, v(I) is the set
of all Boolean triples, O is the singleton set of one Boolean
output, v(O) = {true, false}, δ(s0, (i1, i2, i3)) = s0, and
λ(s0, (i1, i2, i3)) = i1 ∧ i2 ∧ i3. Often, state machines are
represented graphically, but since we model basic block types
by writing their code, such a representation is not needed in
this paper. Another example of a basic block type is the unit
delay, whose NuSMV and Promela code has been shown in
Sections II-B and II-C.
In MODCHK, basic blocks are specified by using a tool
dialog to define the block interface, and then a text editor
to write the NuSMV code. Manual modeling is a necessity,
since many vendors (especially in the nuclear domain) use
non-standard, proprietary languages [8]. Block graphics are
specified using Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG).
B. Block networks
A basic block instance is a pair of a basic block type and
a unique name. A block network is a quadruple (B, I,O,C),
where B is the set of basic block instances, I is the set of
inputs, O is the set of outputs, and C is the set of connections.
Each connection can join either an output of one basic block
instance with an input of another basic block instance, an
output of a basic block instance with an output of the block
network, an input of the block network with an input of a basic
block instance, or an input of a basic block instance with a
constant.
Such a definition allows viewing the entire block network
as a single Mealy machine. During a single execution cycle
of such a machine, values propagate along the connections,
allowing all basic block instances to execute. A problem,
however, arises in cases of cyclic dependencies between basic
blocks. In a broader context, this issue is discussed in [23].
The problem can be addressed by using unit delays to break
such cycles and specifying the processing order explicitly.
Block networks are drawn manually in MODCHK, mimick-
ing the structure of the original function block based control
application. Basic block instances are added to the networks
in a drag-and-drop fashion, and connected by drawing wires.
Specified function blocks are used to set up model inputs, out-
puts, and other monitors. If necessary, the modeling procedure
also involves:
1) replacing continuous values with integers;
2) limiting possible values that integer inputs can have;
3) setting delay length parameters to sufficiently but not
overly large values;
4) breaking any existing feedback loops with a unit delay
block;
Fig. 1. MODCHK block network PlusMinus, which computes either the sum
or the difference of inputs IN0 and IN1 depending on the value of the Boolean
input SWITCH. The basic block instance MINUS has the same type as PLUS,
but is configured to multiply the lower argument by −1 before adding.
5) specifying abstract representations for (or just omitting)
complex function blocks (e.g. PID controllers).
Fig. 1 shows an example (hereinafter called the PlusMinus
example) of a simple block network drawn in MODCHK,
which will be further used for illustration purposes. Basic
block types used in this model correspond to the ones of the
Apros1 continuous process simulator.
C. Translation to NuSMV
The tool MODCHK is able to generate NuSMV code
for specified block networks automatically [18]. Below,
we exemplify this translation on the PlusMinus block net-
work. This code assumes that basic block types such as
BINARY_SWITCH and ADDER_3 are defined in the same
NuSMV model. In the VAR section of the code, basic block
instances of these types are declared. In addition to usual
inputs and outputs, the code specifies processing of signal
validity (which is not used in this model, but is very relevant in
many nuclear applications for dealing with, e.g., measurement
failure, or loss of communication between subsystems [18])
and the information about the presence of input connections.
MODULE PlusMinus(IN0, IN0_FAULT, IN0_CONNECTED, IN1,
IN1_FAULT, IN1_CONNECTED, SWITCH, SWITCH_FAULT,
SWITCH_CONNECTED)
VAR





PLUS : ADDER_3(0, FALSE, FALSE, IN0, IN0_FAULT,
TRUE, IN1, IN1_FAULT, TRUE, 1, 1, 1);
MINUS : ADDER_3(0, FALSE, FALSE, IN0, IN0_FAULT,




Another code fragment below shows how to specify input
ranges for the network to form an open-loop model. Later,
1http://www.apros.fi/en/
we will also consider closed-loop models, where the module










Finally, LTL requirements for the block network can be
specified:
LTLSPEC G(!SWITCH -> (OUT = IN0 + IN1))
LTLSPEC G(SWITCH -> (OUT = IN0 - IN1))
D. Translation to Promela
The translation of block networks to Promela which is
described in this section is novel and has not been reported
previously, unlike the one to NuSMV. It has been implemented
as a Java application2 which accepts basic block types spec-
ified in Promela and the block network specified in NuSMV,
and produces the code of the block network in Promela.
Thus, except the aforementioned need to provide basic blocks
in Promela (in our case, since the blocks were originally
developed in NuSMV, we translated them manually), and
the lack of automatic translation of temporal properties from
NuSMV to Promela (which would not present any scientific
novelty), the translation procedure is automatic.
Three translation problems have been identified prior to
implementing the translation:
1) Order of basic block execution: in NuSMV, execu-
tion of different basic block instances is inseparable
since all instances make a step synchronously. Thus,
dependencies between blocks are resolved implicitly. In
SPIN, however, the execution order needs to be specified
explicitly.
2) SPIN does not support function calls, which would have
been useful to execute basic blocks.
3) The exact way of specifying the model of the block net-
work influences the results of verification. For example,
intermediate states during the execution of the network
and its basic block instances often must not be visible as
parts of infinite behaviors during LTL model checking.
Moreover, resulting Promela models must be equivalent
to respective NuSMV ones to make the comparison
between SPIN and NuSMV valid.
The first problem has been resolved by analyzing depen-
dencies between basic blocks and organizing their execution
in the order of topological sort, whose implementation is linear
of the number of block instances. However, dependencies may
be circular due to possible presence of feedback loops in the
network. In Section III-B, we have made an assumption that
2https://github.com/igor-buzhinsky/modchk-to-spin
all such loops are explicitly broken by a unit delay block. Al-
though formally there is a circular dependency between block
instances even when such blocks are used, these dependencies
can be resolved by executing unit delay blocks before any
other blocks, and then executing the rest of the blocks in the
topological order.
A known solution to resolve the second problem is to use
process types for each function (which, in our case, would
contain the code specifying the basic block). For example,
such a solution has been used in [13], and a possible imple-
mentation of this solution for the unit delay block has been
given in Section II-B. However, for our problem, in which
basic blocks do not contain any function calls, a better solution
exists: for each basic block instance, we inline its code into
the place where it must be executed (variable names used in
the definition of the block type are substituted with unique
names for each inlined block instance). This solution has the
benefit of being able to wrap the whole block network code
into a single d_step sequence – that is, make SPIN treat it
as an indivisible statement, which is computationally efficient.
The third problem, which relates to the way the Promela
model is organized in general, is solved by applying the
following pattern. Since no processes are needed to execute
basic block instances, the whole system executes within the
single default process init. In this process, model execution
is organized as an infinite loop where first inputs to the block
network are selected (in the closed-loop case, this involves
executing the plant model, which receives the previous outputs
of the controller), and then the block network executes. The
body of the loop is marked as atomic to make its interme-
diate steps invisible in model checking. The overview of the
described pattern is provided below:
// <Variable declarations>
init { do :: atomic {
// <Nondeterministic controller input selection>
d_step {
// <Block network execution>
}
} od }
Promela models following this pattern are equivalent to
NuSMV ones in the following sense: the sets of possible
executions of Promela and NuSMV models (represented as
sequences of controller inputs and outputs) are equal, provided
that the first dummy behavior element (where none of the
variables are initialized) is removed from Promela behaviors.
The reasons why this happens are that only steps between
each cycle of plant and controller execution are included into
behaviors (like in NuSMV), and that basic block executions
are scheduled in the order of dependencies between them (this
makes each cycle execute like in NuSMV). This equivalence
holds under the assumption that all Promela and NuSMV basic
blocks are equivalent in a similar sense.
An example of applying the described translation procedure
to the PlusMinus example in the open-loop case is shown be-
low. The original generated code was shortened: less relevant
parts have been simplified, and some declarations have been
omitted (shown as “...”).










init { do :: atomic {




































ltl p_plus { [] (INPUT_SWITCH ||
(OUT == INPUT_IN0 + INPUT_IN1))) }
ltl p_minus { [] (!INPUT_SWITCH ||
(OUT == INPUT_IN0 - INPUT_IN1))) }
IV. COMPARISON ON A CASE STUDY
The described techniques of modeling block networks in
NuSMV and SPIN have been applied on a case study, which
is based on an Apros model of an NPP with a pressurized
water reactor (PWR), hereinafter referred to as the generic
PWR model. This model has been provided by Fortum Power
and Heat Oy,3 a power utility with NPP operation license in
Finland, and incorporates main NPP process components and
corresponding automation devices.
Due to the large size of the generic PWR model, we
considered only eight control subsystems, each represented
by an Apros automation diagram. To avoid disclosure, the
3http://www.fortum.com/
names of these subsystems were masked and, from now on,
are referred to as S1, ..., S8. These subsystems are responsible
for protection functions (S1–S4), reactor power and turbine
trip (i.e. shutdown) control (S5), pressurizer control (S6, S7)
and feed water tank water level control (S8). Executing the
Promela model generation technique for all control subsystems
took only two seconds in total.
A. Preparation of formal models
All the considered I&C subsystems have been modeled
in the MODCHK tool, and then converted to NuSMV and
Promela. To allow closed-loop model checking, plant models
were generated automatically. Manual plant modeling was
not attempted due to the complexity of the case study, and
automatic translation of the Apros model to a formal one was
impossible due to the lack of tool to perform it.
As an algorithm of plant model construction, the procedure
from [9] was used. To apply it, we prepared a set of behavior
traces collected based on simulations in Apros. This set in-
cluded 3000 traces, each capturing the behavior of the generic
PWR model along a four-minute interval with a sampling
rate of one second (thus, each trace contained 240 elements).
Although the work [9] is devoted to plant model synthesis from
behavior traces and LTL properties using satisfiability solvers,
it also describes a simplified and more scalable procedure
which only works when behavior traces is the only type of
input data for plant model construction. The latter procedure
was applied.
Table I shows the complexity of obtained formal subsystem
models in terms of inputs, outputs, and the number of internal
basic block instances. It also shows the number of states in
generated plant models. This number varies greatly among
subsystems, corresponding to various degrees of abstraction,
which are primarily connected with different numbers of
controller inputs rather than subsystem complexity.
Plant models were generated as explicitly represented non-
deterministic Moore machines, which means that their outputs
(that is, inputs for the controller) depend only on the state.
Each continuous output actually represented a range of values.
Considering such ranges (i.e. allowing the actual value to
be selected nondeterministically within the range) in SPIN
models would have led to dramatic state space expansion –
thus, only the middle value (rounded to an integer) was used
for each interval. In NuSMV, state space expansion itself is
not a major problem, so the mentioned extra nondeterminism
was considered in addition to the case of fixed output values.
In the latter case, the NuSMV model was equivalent to the
Promela one and thus model checking was expected to yield
identical results.
B. Temporal requirements
Temporal requirements for subsystems were formulated
in LTL. All of them were also possible to be equivalently
formulated in CTL, which was done since NuSMV often
checks CTL requirements faster than equivalent LTL ones
(assuming that BDD-based model checking is used). The
requirements were elicited based on the documentation of the
generic PWR model and its Apros implementation. The most
common requirement types specified:
1) an eventual or one step delayed response of the block
network to a satisfaction of a certain condition on inputs;
2) the lack of such response when the condition was not
satisfied.
The numbers of temporal requirements elicited for each of the
system are reported in Table II.
C. Experiments
All experiments were performed on the Intel Core i7-4510U
CPU with the clock rate of 2GHz. The used versions of
NuSMV and SPIN were 2.6.0 and 6.4.5 respectively. For each
subsystem, six model checking runs were performed in total.
They included verification in SPIN with fixed controller input
values and verification in NuSMV with both fixed input values
and input value ranges (see Section IV-A). The experiments
were done both in the open-loop and in the closed-loop case.
In NuSMV, we considered only BDD-based model check-
ing: BMC was not applied since it is parameterized by a bound
which influences both verification complexity and results and
hence would complicate the comparison of NuSMV with
SPIN. CTL model checking in NuSMV was started right
after running the tool (optimization flags “-df”, “-coi” and “-
dynamic” were applied). The situation was different in SPIN,
which first generated and then compiled the C code for the
Promela model (optimization level O2 was used). Time limit
for model checking was set to ten minutes per temporal
requirement in both NuSMV and SPIN.
D. Results
While analyzing the results, we decided to focus on model
checker performance rather than the meaning of the results
in terms of the generic PWR model. This focus is connected
with our primary goal – to investigate the efficiency of SPIN
in nuclear I&C verification. The results of experiments in
terms of total model checking time are shown in Table II. The
following conclusions can be made by observing the data:
1) Open-loop model checking in SPIN often fails to ter-
minate within the time limit. This is not surprising,
provided that the state space of the model is at least
as large as the number of possible input combinations,
which is exponential of the number of inputs (see
Table I).
2) In contrast, open-loop model checking in NuSMV is
fast, which mostly complies with our previous experi-
ence. It appears, however, that input ranges are more
difficult for NuSMV to process. The results of verifica-
tion with ranges instead of fixed inputs are more reliable
since the block network is checked on a larger set of
possible inputs.
3) The same difference between fixed inputs and input
ranges holds for closed-loop verification in NuSMV.
4) Closed-loop verification time in SPIN is always lower
than the one in NuSMV, and in some cases the ratio
TABLE I
PARAMETERS OF THE SUBSYSTEMS OF THE GENERIC PWR MODEL
Subsystem of the generic PWR model S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8
Inputs
Real-valued 4 6 1 7 11 13 2 2
Boolean 0 2 24 2 6 0 0 0
Outputs
Real-valued 3 0 0 1 1 3 9 6
Boolean 0 12 24 4 2 0 0 0
Basic block instances 49 41 38 22 29 27 16 18
States in the plant model 14 1355 1206 192 4906 1904 20 100
TABLE II
MODEL CHECKING TIME (IN SECONDS). TIME LIMIT VIOLATION IS INDICATED AS “TL”
Subsystem of the generic PWR model S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8
Number of temporal requirements 9 24 26 15 10 18 11 8
Open-loop time
SPIN, fixed inputs 54 TL TL TL TL TL 3 8
NuSMV, fixed inputs 5 1 11 11 1 21 1 2
NuSMV, input ranges 106 48 31 369 2 TL 2 3
Closed-loop time
SPIN, fixed inputs 3 44 277 98 256 148 3 3
NuSMV, fixed inputs 2611 137 769 TL 718 1104 268 8
NuSMV, input ranges 1773 TL 2069 TL 1428 TL 347 12
of these times approaches or even exceeds 100. Such
a result can be explained using the arguments given in
Section II-D while describing the results of work [11].
The difference of our case is that, due to plant models
encoded as explicit state machines, the length of this
encoding is roughly proportional to the number of
states, resulting in plant models significantly larger than
controller ones in half of the cases. This might have
decelerated NuSMV even more than in [11].
5) SPIN model checking time is higher for subsystems with
larger plant models. This can be explained by the larger
state space which needs to be explored.
6) The corresponding dependency for NuSMV cannot be
established: for example, high verification times were
observed for S1 and S4, which are relatively small in
terms of the number of states in the plant model. On
one hand, such a dependency was anticipated since,
in the case of generated explicit-state plant models, a
higher number of states means longer NuSMV model
representation, which, in turn, means larger BDDs for
NuSMV to process. On the other hand, performance of
symbolic model checking is highly unpredictable [15].
It may depend not only on the length of the textual
description of the model, but also on dependencies
between variables. A larger case study and a more
thorough exploration may be needed to understand on
what aspects of formal models symbolic model checking
performance depends.
The following additional notes need to be made concerning
the results:
1) Model preparation time in SPIN may comprise a signifi-
cant share of total verification time in the case of closed-
loop verification with a large plant model (i.e. a thousand
of states or more). The most demonstrative cases are S2
(1355 states in the plant model, the preparation phase
lasted 88% of the total verification time) and S5 (4906
states, 92%).
2) Verification results in SPIN and NuSMV matched each
other in the case of fixed inputs. An opposite result
would have meant that the proposed translation of block
diagrams to Promela does not produce models equivalent
to NuSMV models generated by MODCHK.
V. RELATED WORK
In [13], explicit-state and symbolic model checking were
compared on the problem of verifying distributed disc con-
troller software. The model of the software was parameterized
with the used number of processes. Explicit-state and symbolic
model checking was done in SPIN and RuleBase (a model
checker originating from SMV, the predecessor of NuSMV),
respectively. The verified software contained function calls
involving non-tail recursion, and thus function execution had
to be emulated using processes. Applying SPIN led to a state
space explosion, and thus it was able to analyze only a tiny
fraction of the state space. On the other hand, RuleBase failed
to verify the software model with more than two processes,
while SPIN was able to handle a larger configuration. In a
more recent study [14], NuSMV was compared with SPIN on
the problem of commercial flight guidance systems verifica-
tion. The conclusions of [14] comply with the ones of [13]:
symbolic model checking is able to properly solve simpler
verification problems, but SPIN is more scalable and is able
to partially solve harder problems (although its verification
results were unsound due to the use of bit-state hashing).
The main difference of our study is the consideration of
closed-loop verification in additional to the more conventional
open-loop verification. In the case of closed-loop verification
in NuSMV, the increase of complexity is connected not with
a larger number of processes, like in [13], [14], but with a
more complex model of a single process. Then, our verification
problem comes from a different field of industry.
Both closed-loop and open-loop verification have been
previously compared in [11]. The comparison was performed
only using NuSMV. Thus, our study extends the results of [11]
by also considering an explicit-state model checker.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have performed a comparison of explicit-
state and symbolic model checking techniques on the problem
of nuclear I&C application verification. In the open-loop sce-
nario, symbolic model checking with NuSMV has been found
clearly superior. The more interesting conclusion is related to
the closed-loop case: if the model of the plant is represented
with an explicitly specified state machine, the use of explicit-
state verification performed by SPIN has been found to be
beneficial despite that symbolic model checking is believed to
be more efficient in practical cases. Thus, similarly to open-
loop and closed-loop verification being complementary to each
other, there may also be no “best” model checking tool.
To enable the comparison, we have developed an efficient
technique to generate block diagram models in the SPIN
language. Although we applied it to nuclear I&C systems only,
block diagrams are commonly used to represent automation
systems in general. For example, a somewhat more complex
model of function block interaction is considered in the
IEC 61499 standard [24].
The results of the performed comparison are especially
valuable in the case of closed-loop verification with generated
plant models [9]: making verification faster may enable it for
larger, more detailed and reliable plant models. On the other
hand, in this study we have not considered manually prepared
plant models, which are not commonly expressed as large
explicit state machines. This may lead to different results, and
hence the scope of our conclusions is limited.
Performing a case study with manually created plant models
may be considered in future work. Different case studies and
a more thorough experiment design may also help understand
in more detail what slows symbolic model checking in the
closed-loop case. Another direction to improve the case study
is to check a wider range of temporal properties, including the
ones which require the plant model to be present.
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